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1 INTRODUCTION
Coping strategies are the bundle of poor people's
responses to declining food availability and entitle-
ments in abnormal seasons or years. Households do
not respond arbitrarily to variability in food supply
and, as a result, people living in conditions where
their main sources of income (and food) are under
recurrent threat develop strategies to minimize risk
to immediate food security and to longer-term live-
lihood security (Frankenberger and Goldstein 1990:
1). This article explores the nature of coping and
adaptation in vulnerable livelihood systems, in or-
der to see whether monitoring coping strategies can
be useful in predicting food stress.
As coping strategies become an increasingly popu-
lar tool in food and livelihood security analysis and
policy-making, so has the idea become more befud-
dled, as researchers and policy-makers confound
the two. The central confusion is between coping
strategies as fall-back mechanisms during periods
when habitual food entitlements are disrupted; and
coping strategies as outcomes of fundamental and
irreversible changes in local livelihood systems.
Clarification is required if coping strategies are to
remain a useful conceptual tool, both for monitoring
declining food availability and for identifying ap-
propriate interventions. Coping is thus defined as a
short-term response to an immediate and inhabitual
decline in access to food. Adapting, in contrast,
means a permanent change in the mix of ways in
which food is acquired, irrespective of the year in
question. As Gore (1992: 16) has correctly argued
"coping" essentially means acting to survive within
the prevailing rule systems. When adaptation
occurs, such rule systems (or the moral economy)
themselves change, as do the livelihood systems in
which these rules operate. Indicators which seek to
track coping strategies have to be able to differenti-
ate between coping within existing rules and adapt-
ing the rules themselves to meet livelihood needs.
Although the importance and proliferation of cop-
ing strategies have long been recognised by anthro-
pologists (D'Souza 1985; Campbell 1990), it is only
recently that their significance for food security
monitoring has been acknowledged. Interest in
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coping strategies arose particularly in the aftermath
of famines in the Sahel and Horn of Africa in the mid
1980s as a means of understanding why it was that
some people survived periods of dearth, whilst oth-
ers did not. Coping strategies are concerned with
livelihood system success rather than failure. This
success was explained in part by the re-interpreta-
tion of food entitlements, to include a wider range of
sources of and calls on entitlements than was habitu-
ally associated with food insecure households (Swift
1989). Amongst others, Watts (1983, 1988) and
Longhurst (1986) have identified patterns of coping
behaviour, based on a widely defined entitlement
base, which have been successful in mitigating the
threat of famine. In addition, the ability of the rural
poor to manage risk and to adapt to longer-term
changes in their livelihood systems has been ac-
corded greater importance than in the past
(Mortimore 1989). Finally, it has been shown that
populations in more marginal environments are
probably much better equipped to cope with periods
of food stress than those accustomed to more secure
conditions (Reardon and Matlon 1989).
The enthusiasm for coping strategies has been fur-
ther fuelled by redefinitions of household food secu-
rity in the light of a sustainable livelihood security
approach to understanding rural communities.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is little
evidence to show that, apart from conditions of
extreme food stress (when livelihood systems have
collapsed and death from starvation is imminent),
people will always meet food security needs first,
irrespective of the consequences of so doing for
other aspects of their livelihood security. De Waal
(1989) found in the 1984/85 famine in Darfur, Su-
dan, that people chose to go hungry in order to
preserve their assets and future livelihoods. Equally,
in comparing the sequential uptake of coping strat-
egies employed in periods of food stress in a number
of African and Asian cases, Corbett (1988) found that
preservation of assets takes priority over meeting
immediate food needs until the point of destitution,
when all options have been exhausted.
2 HOW USEFUL IS THE CONCEPT OF COPING
STRATEGIES?
Increasingly, coping strategies are regarded as being
an inherently good thing, but there is a tendency for
them to become shorthand for a complex web of
processes at work. This can add to confusion about
what coping strategies indicate is happening in fam-
ine-prone communities; and what policy options are
inferred. Lack of clarity about what 'coping strate-
gies' really are makes for little dynamism in their
analysis. Four areas of concern require clarification.
First, 'coping strategies' is often used as a catch-all
term to describe everything that rural producers do
over and above primary productive activities. Whilst
it is perhaps justifiable to argue that for food-poor
households, all decisions are influenced by and have
some bearing on food poverty, it is not analytically
helpful to think of everything as a coping strategy. It
simply becomes synonymous with the socio-
economy of the household or, more recently, with
livelihood security.
Second, focusing on coping strategies in situations
of food stress can imply that people do cope and thus
that food insecurity is a transitory phenomenon.
This conflicts with the distinction habitually made
between transitory and chronic food insecurity
(World Bank 1986). If people also 'cope' with chronic
food insecurity, then the distinction between their
normal behaviour and their coping behaviour is far
from clear. At the extreme, all behaviour becomes a
coping strategy when, for example, pastoralists have
lost their animals and hence their means of primary
production. Such groups who have fallen out of the
bottom of liveithood systems are uniquely vulner-
able and indeed have to cope to survive. But it is
conceptually confusing to lump the means of sub-
sistence eked out by such people (the ultra-poor and
destitute) with pre-planned strategies used by peo-
ple within a livelihood system to overcome an ex-
ceptionally severe episode of food insecurity. Fur-
ther, searching for and monitoring coping strategies
can mask the collapse of livelihood systems by pre-
supposing that people cope even in subsistence
economies which are no longer viable from the point
of view of either food or livelihood security. Duffield
(1990), drawing on evidence from Sudan, argues
that there are parts of the country where the combi-
nation of agro-climatic conditions, civil war and
impoverishment from repeated famine has rendered
some groups incapable of surviving, irrespective of
current conditions. These are precisely the circum-
stances in which famine risks becoming endemic
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and where rural producers will need to radically
alter their livelihood strategies to survive. An em-
phasis on 'coping' may blind policy-makers and
researchers to the need for a radical re-appraisal of
the requirements of people's livelihoods in marginal
areas.
Third, while coping strategies may be useful in the
short-term (and indeed, those who employ them
have little option), they may be bad for longer-term
development; both from the point of view of those
who practice them and of those who seek to inter-
vene to facilitate the development process. Implicit
in coping strategies is that the entire working life of
subsistence producers is taken up in acquiring food;
enabling people to stand still, but preventing them
from moving ahead. A focus on coping strategies
also hides the (increasing) need of rural producers to
develop livelihood strategies which will provide for
greater numbers of people in the future. Growth
linkages are thus central to the process of adaptation,
but rarely included in analyses of coping behaviour.
This assertion is, to some extent, contradicted by the
sustainable livelihood security approach, insofar as
meeting food needs may be pushed into second
place behind securing future livelihoods. But this
holds only to the point where such choicesmake
those livelihoods more secure in the future than in
the present. All too often, future livelihoods are no
more secure as a result of these choices, implying
that there is no saving in the household; and that
liveithoods are dominated by the need to avoid risk,
including the risk of investing in production.
Fourth, and linked to this, is the fact that coping
strategies are not necessarily economically or envi-
ronmentally sustainable. De Waal (1989) distin-
guishes between 'non-erosive' and 'erosive' coping,
in order to differentiate those strategies which use
extra sources of income and do not erode the subsist-
ence base of the household (thereby compromising
future livelthood security), from those which do not
entail such costs. There is as yet little evidence to
show how the trade-off between subsistence and
economic sustainability works in meeting immedi-
ate food needs and longer-term livelihood ones. A
study of coping strategy use over four years in Mali
has shown that the overwhelming characteristic of
strategies pursued is that they offer - without excep-
tion - uncertain, piecemeal and poorly remunerated
means of filling the annual food gap (Davies 1993).
To find out more about the subsistence/economic
sustainability trade-off, the ability of these strategies
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to reduce vulnerability over much longer periods
than a simple cycle of famine and rehabilitation
would have to be assessed. On the environmental
side, quick correlations between 'abusive' coping
strategies (e.g. cutting down trees to sell wood) and
environmental degradation are often made. Recent
evidence indicates that marginal semi-arid zones are
probably much more resilient to degradation than is
generally assumed (Behnke et al. 1993). Insofar as
coping strategies are concerned, this suggests that
much more careful analyses of the environmental
consequences of poor people's actions in response to
livelihood risk need to be carried out.
These latter two criticisms of coping strategies have
implications for the often-advocated (albeit rarely
implemented) reinforcement of indigenous coping
strategies as a more appropriate and effective method
of famine mitigation (and promotion of livelihood
sustainability) than distributing emergency food aid
once livelihoods have been eroded (e.g. WFP 1989).
Reinforcing coping strategies may lock people into a
vicious circle of subsistence and coping. If, on the
other hand, food insurance for the very poor is
provided, it enables them to be economically active
(to take risks, to save). Thus, whereas there is an
economic efficiency argument for guaranteeing food
security, over and above the purely humanitarian
one, reinforcing coping strategies may be economi-
cally inefficient because it will reinforce the risk-
averse survival-orientation of poor people. Indeed,
it might be argued that the focus oñ short-term
alleviation and the allied notion of 'coping' create
the very conditions of dependency rural producers
are often blamed for having.
3 COPING WITH SECURITY, ADAPTING TO
VULNERABILITY
Coping (in)capacity cannot be separated from the
nature and intensity of vulnerability. The reasons
why households pursue a particular mix of coping
strategies and their timing for so doing depend on a
complex range of criteria which are intimately linked
to different dimensions of vulnerability, two of the
most important of which are resilience and sensitiv-
ity (see Bayliss-Smith 1991).' Highly resilient sys-
tems have the capacity to bounce back to a normal
state after food crises, which is contingent upon
having coping strategies which are reserved for
1 Bayliss-Srnith draws on Blaikie and Brookfield's (1987) analysis of
thesustainabilityofagriculturalecosystemsindistinguishingbetween
these characteristics.
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periods of unusual stress. The sensitivity of a liveli-
hood system refers to the intensity with which the
shock is experienced: in highly sensitive systems,
coping strategies are not available to cushion the
shock. Further, the greater the sensitivity, the fur-
ther the system will need to bounce back; conse-
quently, there is a vicious circle between increasing
sensitivity, declining resilience and an inability to
bounce back.
Coping strategies are the means by which resilient
systems weather the bottom of the drought/recov-
ery curve shown in Figure 1 and, if they are to be
good indicators of unusual stress, are used only at
the point in the curve indicated, and abandoned
once recovery is underway. Genuine coping strate-
gies must therefore be distinguished from insurance
strategies (undertaken to minimize the risk of pro-
duction failure) and recovery strategies (designed to
facilitate bounce-back).
If, on the other hand, coping strategies are part of a
low resilience and highly sensitive livelihood sys-
tem, they will be used every year in some seasons to
bridge the food gap (Figure 2). In this instance, their
use can only indicate an anticipated hungry season
and not deviations in the norm. If low resilience
systems are characterised by fundamental adapta-
tions after each period of severe drought (because
they no longer have coping strategies reserved for
such periods to facilitate bounce back), then any
sequence of coping in subsequent periods of drought
will be very different from what went before.
Vulnerable livelihood systems, characterisedbyprop-
erties of low resilience and high sensitivity, thus find
it hard to cope. People in secure (resilient and
insensitive) livelihood systems practice coping strat-
egies only when necessary, as part of a wider portfo-
lio of risk management. In contrast, people in vul-
nerable systems are more likely to pursue adaptive
strategies, seeking to use all available options at all
times to maximize the trade-off between increasing
resilience and reducing sensitivity. In so doing,
adaptive livelihood systems are moving towards a
new equilibrium, part of which is the trade-off be-
tween sustainability and subsistence, or seeking to
preserve assets for future production, often at the
cost of current consumption. The intensity of vul-
nerability is greatest when proximate and structural
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vulnerability coincide.2 'Vulnerability is thus a com-
posite of the states of past and current events' (Borton
and Shoham 1991), and structurally vulnerable live-
lihood systems hit by drought will be less able to
cope than secure systems. Within these systems
there are, of course, differentially vulnerable house-
holds and individuals, further compounding liveli-
hood system vulnerability. Thus Longhurst (1986),
for example, notes that in communities with land
holding and income inequalities, household re-
sponses will differ. Watts (1988) also describes how
wealthier households can benefit from the distress
sales (of livestock, assets or labour) at depressed
prices by poorer members of the community. The
most vulnerable people are those who struggle to
survive in vulnerable households and vulnerable
livelihood systems. It is they who have the most
constrained capacity to cope with shocks such as
drought; and hence who are most vulnerable to
famine. The ability to mitigate this vulnerability is
contingent upon their capacity to adapt.
4 COPING STRATEGIES AND FAMINE EARLY
WARNING
In line with the recognition of coping strategies as a
means of explaining how poor households deal with
food stress, there has been a call for monitoring their
progress within famine early warning systems (EWS),
particularly local information systems concerned
with early detection of food insecurity, not simply of
famine. Finding out what producers do to help
themselves to overcome chronic and transitory food
shortages - or monitoring their coping strategies - is
crucial: to interpret standard indicators of food stress
(e.g. does a particular pattern of migration signify a
normal or abnormal activity?); to assess the intensity
of food insecurity (e.g. if the harvest fails, are there
sufficient fall-back options to meet food needs?);
and to identify appropriate responses (e.g. do peo-
pie need food to eat or help in retaining their produc-
tive assets?).
There is an appealing symmetry in a coping strat-
egy-based approach to early warning: it can simul-
taneously predict, and inform how to prevent, fam-
ine. Implicit in much (but by no means all) of this call
for monitoring coping strategies is a belief that they
will not only assist in predicting food crises, but also
2 Downing (1990, cited in Frankenberger 1992: 82) similarly
distinguishes between baseline and current vulnerability. Future
vulnerability refers to the trends associated with long-term food
securityrisks.
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
64
indicate appropriate and sustainable interventions
to mitigate that crisis. Indigenous coping strategies
can be reinforced, in preference to imposing exter-
nal, often late, inappropriate and unsustainable so-
lutions to food crises, epitomized by emergency
food aid distributions. Whereas food aid invariably
assists producers only once they have lost the means
to feed themselves, monitoring coping strategies has
the potential to identify ways of protecting and
reinforcing system success and adaptation before
collapse. If successful, such interventions would
warn earlier of the destitution implicit in famine and
possibly even prevent it. In so doing, the long-term
effects of structural livelihood system vulnerability
to food shortages which persist once the crisis is over
could be reduced.
Clearly, it is not possible to monitor all the different
criteria which determine coping strategy use. Struc-
tural factors which determine coping choices are
insensitive to short-term changes in the overall food
situation, and tracking proximate factors at house-
hold level is beyond the scope of even local EWS, let
alone those operating over larger areas. Any moni-
toring system, to be sustainable, has to derive indica-
tors which can be tracked over time and sensibly
interpreted without too much difficulty. It is by no
means clear that coping strategy indicators of food
stress can do this, certainly they cannot by implicitly
assuming homogeneity of motive and livelihood
status. Even when livelihoods are differentiated,
differences between communities and households
within the same broad livelihood system can be as
great as those between livelihood systems. Further
differentiation by individual or household determi-
nants of vulnerability could assist the process; but
practically, the spread of combinations of strategy
use and of sequences of uptake would be so great as
to make monitoring (let alone interpretation) highly
complex.
5 INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT USING COPING
STRATEGIES
The use of coping strategies to develop more appro-
priate indicators of food stress has been character-
ized by two - often conflicting - trends. On the one
hand, at a conceptual level, outsiders' perceptions of
the complexity of vulnerable people's responses to
3 Cited in Frankenberger (1992: 82).
drought have improved significantly in the last ten
years or so. On the other hand, attempts to
operationalize these conceptual advances have been
both limited and often unsuccessful. The iteration
between conceptual advances and their practical
application has often been to the detriment of the
latter. Although increasingly advocated, examples
of the use of coping strategies to monitor food
insecurity are rare. A handful of local level systems
in the Sahel and Horn of Africa which incorporate
them to some degree have been identified by
Buchanan-Smith et al. (1991). Eele (1987), amongst
others, has demonstrated how possible sources of
information about coping strategies could be grafted
on to existing EWS relatively easily. Broadly speak-
ing, there were three phases in the evolution of
indicator development based on coping strategies:
1 1970s: during this time coping strategies were
ignored by most famine EWS, reflecting the pre-
occupation with supply of food (but not access to
it) and with aggregate indices of supply and
demand (epitomized by national food balance
sheets).
2 1980s: models of sequential uptake predomi-
nated in the 1980s, especially in the aftermath of
the famines in the Sahel and Horn of Africa in the
middle of the decade.
3 1990s: a new realism now characterises the po-
tential for indicator-based coping strategies, based
on the realisation that earlier models were over-
simplified and were often operationally imprac-
tical. Whether or not the new realism at a concep-
tual level can be translated into functioning EWS
remains to be seen.
6 THE 1980S: NICE IDEA, SHAME ABOUT THE
PRACTICE
The ability to monitor coping strategies to predict
food crises is predicated upon the assumption that
they follow a discernible and repeatable sequence.
Evidence from Africa and Asia supports the idea
that the range of coping strategies available to rural
producers is similar across very different food sys-
tems (Longhurst 1986, Downing 1988). Watts (1983),
drawing on evidence from northern Nigeria in 1973/
74, identified the ten most commonly observed re-
4 Corbett considers inter alia Cutler's sequence from Red Sea
Province Sudan in 1984 (Cutler 1986); Rahmato's (1987) sequence
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sponses to food crisis as follows: collect famine
foods; borrow grain from kin; sell labour power
(migration); engage in dry season farming (migra-
tion); sell small livestock; borrow grain or money
from merchants/moneylenders; sell domestic as-
sets; pledge farmland; sell farmland; and migrate
out permanently. Corbett (1988), reviewing this and
other empirical evidence4 for the sequential uptake
of coping strategies, identifies the sequence in Table
1 which 'provides a useful tool for analysing the
economic behaviour of households prior to and
during famines' (ibid.: 1107).
The idea of sequential uptake has been refined to
distinguish between insurance strategies and coping
strategies. Insurance strategies are those activities
undertaken to reduce the likelihood of failure of
primary production (e.g. changes in cropping and
planting patterns, or in levels and types of invest-
ment in primary production such as a shift from
cattle to goats by pastoralists). Coping strategies are
employed once the principal source of production
has failed to meet expected levels, when insurance
strategies have failed or are failing, and producers
have to literally 'cope' until the next harvest. Thus,
Frankenberger and Goldstein (1990) distinguish be-
tween various types of risk management and pat-
terns of copingbehaviour (e.g. asset depletion, break-
down of community reciprocity, non-farm coping
strategies), as well as between types of household
assets which will play different roles in the process
of coping. On this basis they argue that 'the dilemma
facing small-farm households involves ... a trade-off
between immediate subsistence and long-term
sustainability' (ibid.: 22). Equally, the World Food
Programme (WFP 1989) differentiates between ac-
cumulation and diversification (or insurance) strat-
egies. The former aim to increase a household's
resource base, and the latter to promote a variety of
sources of income with different patterns of risk, to
avoid the exposure associated with a single income
source (ibid.: 3). Accumulation strategies include
food stocking, credit schemes, productive invest-
ment and investment in education and training.
Diversification strategies include agricultural diver-
sification, migration and remittances, and diversifi-
cation of employment opportunities. A further
distinction is made between hungry season strate-
gies used for part of most years and strategies to
survive particularly bad years.
from Wollo Province. Ethiopia in 1984/85; and de Waal's (1989)
sequence from Darfur, Sudan in 1984/85.
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Within the framework of models of sequential up-
take, three sets of indicators have been developed to
monitor changing coping responses. Building on
the work of the World Food Programme,
Frankenberger and Hutchinson (1991) summarize
these as follows:
1 Early (or leading indicators), that is, changes in
conditions and responses prior to the onset of
reduced food access. They include: signs of crop
failure; lack of pasture (leading to animal deaths,
unusual migration patterns, unusual sales of
animals); and changes in exchange relationships
(e.g. unseasonal price rises of grains, falling casual
labour rates);
2 Stress (or concurrent) indicators are those which
occur simultaneously with reduced access to
food. They include: unusual numbers of mi-
grants in search of work; unusual sales of assets
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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on local markets; unusual sales of land or mort-
gages; unusually high demand for credit; in-
creased dependence on wild food; reduced food
intake (number of meals);
3 Late outcome (or trailing) indicators occur once
food access has declined. They include: increased
prevalence of undernutrition and morbidity; in-
creased land degradation; land sales; and perma-
nent out migration.
Refinements in the categorization of coping strate-
gies are informed by a desire to simplify complex
patterns of decision-making and response. As mod-
els of coping strategy use have been refined, so has
much justified caution in their application been cast
aside. Such warnings include Corbett's (1988: 1109)
point that 'variations in observed strategies also
suggest that there are few universal indicators of
impending famine and famine warning systems
Table 1: The Sequential Use Of Insurance And Coping Strategies
Sequential Use Of Examples Of Strategies Characteristics Of Strategies
Strategies
STAGE I
Insurance - changes in cropping and planting - risk-minimizing
Mechanisms practices - loss-management
- sale of smalistock - low commitment of domestic
- reduction of current consumption resources
levels
- collection of wild foods
- use of inter-household transfers and loans
- increased petty commodity production
- migration in search of employment
- sale of possessions (e.g. jewellery)
STAGE 2
Disposal of - sale of livestock (e.g. oxen) - high commitment of
Productive Assets - sale of agricultural tools sale or domestic resources
(Coping) mortgaging of land
- credit from merchants and
moneylenders
- reduction of current consumption
levels
STAGE 3
Destitution distress migration failure to cope
Source: Adapted from Corbett 1988 and Frankenberger 1992.
need to be locally specific'. Further, as Frankenberger
(1992: 84) argues, 'models that ignore the locational
specificity of ecological and economic aspects are
likely to select proxy indicators which are inappro-
priate or misinterpreted'. Even if at a conceptual
level, the necessity to proceed with care is well
recognised, in the practical implementation of infor-
mation systems which incorporate indicators of cop-
ing strategy use, there has been a tendency to look for
universal truths. If coping strategies are to be em-
ployed as predictive indicators of food stress, it is
essential that their use by food insecure groups
follows discernible patterns capable of being moni-
tored. Otherwise, coping strategies are little more
than random responses to food insecurity which can
play no role in prediction. It is at this point that the
use of coping strategies to monitor changing levels
in food security runs into difficulties. Despite the
apparent simplicity of models of sequential uptake,
operationally they pose a number of difficulties.
The major drawback to such models is that house-
holds juggle between different activities simultane-
ously and in response to the seasonal options avail-
able to them. In the case of sales of assets, for
example, rural people are highly conversant with
the seasonal terms of trade between goods (e.g.
livestock and cereals) and will seek to maximize
their revenue over a year by playing the market.
Although the literature identifies the grey area be-
tween strategies as responses to unusual changes in
access to food, and strategies as more permanent
reactions to fundamentally altered conditions, once
coping strategy uptake becomes an indicator of
transitory food stress, this grey area must of neces-
sity be ignored. Either use of a particular strategy
signals stress or it does not. Attempts to differentiate
between why different people pursue a particular
strategy at a given moment make for highly complex
monitoring requirements.
Second, a coping strategy-based approach to moni-
toring access to food is criticised, and rejected by
most EWS, because its information needs are too
complex, expensive and time consuming. In recent
years, the thrust of much early warning thinking,
and views about information needs for rural devel-
opment more generally, has been to minimize infor-
mation requirements or to opt for what advocates of
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) term 'optimal igno-
rance' (McCracken et al. 1988). A coping strategy-
based approach contradicts this trend, although
methodologies can be developed which simplify
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information collection (see Davies 1993). Further,
the raw data used as indicators can be misleading,
necessitating the validation of data quality which
can further add to the burden of the information
system (Frankenberger 1992).
The third obstacle is the capacity to analyse data and
to interpret them quickly enough to permit timely
response. Almost all concurrent indicators, for ex-
ample, are prefaced by the word 'unusual', implicit
in which is some baseline by which deviations from
the norm can be measured. Without such a baseline,
indicators are hard to interpret sensibly; and further,
what is normal in one context, maybe very different
from another neighbouring area (Frankenberger
1992). Unusual migration is a frequent casualty in
this respect: empty villages after the harvest are used
to indicate migration driven by poor harvests,
whereas in fact they can be due to habitual reciprocal
labour exchanges between neighbouring agro-eco-
logical zones with differing harvest times (part of the
moral economy, not of a collapsing food economy).
Furthermore, such migration patterns are a function
of the usual variability of production in the same
agro-ecological zone, or between neighbouring agro-
ecological ones.
Fourth, such models can easily disguise intra-com-
munity variation, by failing to account for the fact
that one person's coping strategy is another's liveli-
hood. Mortimore (1989), for example, shows how
adaptive behaviour to drought over a thirteen year
period in Northern Nigeria varies between house-
holds, in the same village. Differences in options and
choices occur at individual, household, community
and livelihood system levels. Ifa particular activity
is identified as being a coping strategy for the pur-
poses of food security monitoring, the assumption is
that all people who take up that activity do so in
order to cope with food stress. Yet, there is no easy
way, for example, of distinguishing between some-
one who is choosing to go hungry to preserve assets
and someone who is hungry and who has no choice,
having previously liquidated all assets. Thus, whereas
the stress indicator of increased dependence on wild
foods appears to be a robust indication of local food
entitlements, in fact in many marginal Sahelian com-
munities, there are groups who now habitually de-
pend on wild foods for subsistence in part of every
year. If early response is at the heart of monitoring
coping strategies, it would be necessary to
disaggregate food security profiles for all groups in
a given area in a normal year.
-
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Finally, the models fail to account for changes over
time. Coping strategies are not cast in stone and with
each cycle of drought and partial rehabilitation, the
range of options will change and the rate of take-up
of particular coping strategies will vary. Riely (1991),
for example, found that in Kordofan, Sudan, asset
redistribution and changes in markets meant that the
experience of drought itself changes the scope for
coping with the next food crisis. So, even if one cycle
has been successfully monitored and understood,
there is no guarantee that next time around, the same
pattern will repeat itself for the same groups of
people, in roughly the same proportions.
7 THE 1990S: THE REALPOLITIKOF COPING
STRATEGIES
Many of those populations living in the Sahel and
Horn of Africa, who have been identified as poten-
tial beneficiaries of monitoring systems which are
based on coping strategies, subsist in low resilience!
high sensitivity livelihood systems which, in turn,
are often found in areas of low resilience and high
sensitivity in natural resource terms. The difficulty
in using these strategies as the basis for developing
indicators of food stress may add grist to the mill of
those early-warners who argue that systems should
remain minimalist and deal only at a high level of
aggregation, because they can never collect suffi-
cient information or make sense of it. This is despite
the fact that local people already have and make use
of such information, and have their own informa-
tion systems. Broad indicators of output and esti-
mates of projected consumption, perhaps with some
proxy indicators of demand such as market prices
must suffice: a return to the fashion of the 1970s. Yet,
these systems too have real drawbacks, not least
their inability to understand how people feed them-
selves (rather than how they fail to do so), and what
kind of interventions would reinforce this process
early on in the cycle of drought and destitution, and
before livelihood systems become unsustainable.
The challenge is to retain the essence of coping
strategy-based monitoring, which can fulfil these
functions, whilst recognising that '1980s models' for
so doing are either too sweeping in their definition of
coping strategies and too simplistic in their assump-
tions about when and why people use them; or
alternatively, that more comprehensive '1990s mod-
els' present formidable operational drawbacks.
Conceptually, the problem is where to draw the line
between behaviour that is principally driven by food
stress (coping); and that which is motivated by the
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need to fundamentally alter the mix of activities
required for subsistence (adapting). The policy op-
tions for each are very different. Coping strategies
indicate that if livelihood systems are given a little
one-off support, they can continue to provide secu-
rity for those who depend on them. Adaptive strat-
egies imply that livelihood systems are moving to-
wards a new equilibrium (or not), necessitating that
external support respond to the much more basic
constraints encountered in such processes. This, in
turn, is central to the identification and fruitful
monitoring of coping strategies as indicators of unu-
sual food stress. In structurally vulnerable liveli-
hood systems, people combine coping and adapting
by optimising the trade-off between reducing sensi-
tivity and increasing resilience. The implication of
this distinction for evolving livelihood systems in
marginal areas is that what were once coping strat-
egies increasingly determine the level of food avail-
ability within households, irrespective of the year in
question, and have hence become part of a process of
adaptation. If strategies are used as part of a process
of adaptation, rather than as short-term responses to
isolated periods of food stress, there are a number of
implications for their use as indicators of food stress
and for policy. Above all, the notion of repeatable
sequential uptake is untenable for the following
reasons:
I The mere fact of using a particular strategy, or
sequence of strategies, can indicate nothing about
food stress, because some people use them all the
time and others do so for part of every year. It is
very hard to know in advance what the sequence
of use will be and who will use which strategies,
unless some historical perspective is incorpo-
rated into monitoring.
2 The timing of use will change depending on how
evolved the process of adaptation is for a given
household or community. What may signal an
alarm at a given point in one year or drought
cycle will be not necessarily indicate the same
thing the next time around.
3 The reasons for uptake will depend on the mix of
adaptive strategies available to particular liveli-
hood systems and households within them. This
mix is determined by: the characteristics of the
strategy in question; where th household is in
the process of adaptation; and other constraints
and opportunities offered by the overall liveli-
hood system. It is very difficult to monitor the
motivation for coping strategy use.
4 The effectiveness of particular strategies in miti-
gating food insecurity is even more difficult to
discern predictively, particularly if the reasons
for pursuing a given strategy are themselves
uncertain. Generally, the effectiveness of coping
strategies is explained retrospectively to eluci-
date why famines did not occur, or why some
people survived.
Whereas it is possible to monitor strategies, it is not
clear what they tell you, unless a distinction is made
between coping and adaptive behaviour. Coping
strategies are most useful as contextual information
which informs about how people are making trade-
offs; and not as clear indicators of something going
wrong. Multiple indicators are essential to help
minimize drawbacks identified above
(Frankenberger 1992). In addition, if coping strate-
gies are to be useful indicators of food stress, it is the
intensity of their use (how dependent households
are on such strategies in a given season year, com-
pared to 'normal'); their sustainability when this
intensity increases (in both an economic and an
environmental sense); the motivation for their use
(coping or adapting); and their effectiveness in
meeting food and livelihood needs (or their costs
and benefits), which must be assessed. This will
define the threshold between fundamental and long-
term changes in livelihoods, and the ability of people
to bounce back to how they lived before. How then
can indicators be developed to encapsulate the com-
plexity of vulnerable livelihood systems without
being unduly complex and infeasible? The first step
is to grade coping or adaptive strategies according to
local conditions and at livelihood system level, on
the basis of these four criteria:
1 Motivation/intensity: a high score for intensity
would indicate that the strategy is already pur-
sued by many people and is thus perceived by
them to be the best option available. Scoring
motivation hinges on whether the strategy is
abandoned once recovery is underway. The
difference between motivation for and intensity
of use could only be made once strategies had
been monitored over a number of years. In
systems undergoing a process of adaptation,
motivation and intensity are part of the process
of moving towards a new equilibrium. In sys-
tems which are coping, they are to facilitate
bounce-back.
2 Effectiveness: a high score would mean that
returns to pursuing a particular strategy were
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more likely than others to assist in filling the food
gap, with the least cost to future livelihood secu-
rity, thereby maximizing the trade-off between
reducing sensitivity and increasing resilience.
3 Economic and/or environmental sustainability:
high economic sustainability would mean that
these strategies could be pursued over time; and
high environmental sustainability, that they did
not have deleterious effects on the natural re-
source base. As indicated above, whether or not
strategies are environmentally sustainable is a
much more complex issue than much of the
desertification of semi-arid lands literature sug-
gests. Certainly, it should not be assumed that
apparently 'abusive' strategies always have del-
eterious and irreversible consequences for the
environment.
In a study of coping options in Mali, it was found -
not surprisingly - that very few strategies score
highly in all, or most, respects, as Table 2 shows
(Davies 1993). It is, however, possible to infer which
strategies are likely to promote immediate food
security without decimating future livelihood secu-
rity, and which have the potential for reinforcement.
Unpacking strategies in this way is a first step to-
wards meeting the requirements for monitoring ad-
aptation, by identifying the kinds of factors which
will influence the intensity of, motivation for and
effectiveness of coping/adaptive strategies, as well
as their economic and environmental sustainability.
Ideally, strategies would be assessed at household
level; but realistically, only system level assessment
is likely to be feasible for a local monitoring system,
although household level constraints must be borne
in mind, especially when considering who will ben-
efit from the reinforcement of a given strategy. It
must be stressed that the overall assessment of cop-
ing/adaptive strategies would need to be updated
regularly, to reflect the changing opportunities af-
forded by different strategies over time.
The next step is to derive indicators from Table 2, as
shown in Table 3. Conventionally, the mere fact of
pursuing a particular strategy is taken to indicate
stress. This may be refined according to the timing
of uptake, in both a seasonal sense and in relation to
other activities. But the implicit assumption is that
it is a coping strategy. Thus, collection of wild foods
signals food stress, and especially so if this occurs
early in the hungry season. If, on the other hand, a
more dynamic multiple-indicator of strategy use
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
model is employed, it is possible to differentiate
between coping and adaptive strategies (motiva-
tion); whether or not a strategy is being unusually
depended upon by many people (intensity); how
effective that strategy is likely to be in filling the food
gap and/or preserving assets (effectiveness); and
whether it is likely to be effective in the future and
capable of (or worth) reinforcing (sustainability). In
the case of wild foods, the indicators suggested in
Table 3 measure a combination of: changes over
time; the seasonality of uptake; production (or avail-
ability) levels; current market signals; and predic-
tions of future supply and demand. Taken together,
these indicators provide a far clearer picture of the
likely meaning of wild food collection, its potential
contribution to mitigating food insecurity, and
whether or not this strategy should be reinforced,
than would a simple recording of the fact that such
foods were being collected.
8 CONCLUSIONS: ARE COPING STRATEGIES
A COP OUT?
Few would dispute the legitimacy of putting indig-
enous coping strategies firmly on the food security
and famine mitigation agenda. Recognition of the
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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central importance of vulnerable people's own re-
sponses to the threat of food and livelihood insecu-
rity by planners and policy-makers was long over-
due. The reservations raised here about coping
strategies - both generally and specifically in the
context of their utility as indicators of food stress -
are not intended to suggest a return to top-down,
impositionist approaches, implicit in which is the
assumption that vulnerable people are passive vic-
tims of insecurity, sitting still when faced with
drought until the rains return.
On the contrary: a focus on indigenous capacity to
respond is by far the most effective starting point for
policies which will combat insecurity in a sustain-
able manner, by helping to optimise the subsist-
ence/sustainability trade-off. Yet the danger that
coping strategies become a cop out is clear: not
because they are unimportant; but rather because of
the tendency for them to become shorthand for
complexities which need to be understood before
they can be simplified for policy-making and imple-
mentation. If not fully understood, coping strategies
justify - and indeed legitimate - short-term response,
even though this is often inappropriate. In the quest
to use coping strategies in policy-making and plan-
Table 2: Grading Of Coping/Adaptive Strategies According To Use




















































ning, hard choices have to be made between opera-
tional feasibility and confronting the complexity of
- and limitations to - indigenous response, close to
where the action is. This includes appropriate re-
sponses to long-term changes in people's liveli-
hoods.
People living in marginal environments have al-
ways lived with risk and a portfolio of options, and
are well aware of the pathways that follow if their
efforts to mitigate proximate stress are unsuccessful.
They are fairly clear about how their livelihoods
have changed over a two to three generation time-
frame. To some extent, the conceptual confusion
arising from researchers' and policy-makers' failure
to grasp the complexities of adaptation is of our own
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making. It implies that the immense amount of
thinking about these issues in the developed world
and in capital cities in the south needs to be sup-
ported by much more information about how poor
people themselves see coping and adaptation and
what this entails for policy and practice: greater
complexity; greater innovation and risk-taking; more
time and money spent closer to where the action is.
But this is only worth doing - and the approach to
EWS suggested only relevant - if monitoring and
reinforcing indigenous coping strategies is part of a
wider livelihood monitoring and reinforcing system
based on the recognition that people's lives are
changing irrevocably. Such a system needs to be
designed to detect collapsing livelihoods, with a
view to saving livelihoods not only lives.
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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